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J\BSTRACT 
Sense perception is certainly a sensible way in which we relate to the world, but thought tends to occur unconsciously. While some thinkers 
argue for the certainty of some mental states, others think that these mental states cannot provide sure foundations for certain interpretations 
of mental states which belong to other individuals. Consequently, it has been argued that due to the nature of the problem of consciousness, 
results obtained from empirical tests tend to lack the capacity to provide intrinsic road maps for future studies and understanding of 
consciousness. While adopting the traditional reconstructive methods of critical analysis in philosophy, the study analysed various attempts 
'·. l('j 
made towards developing test measures and theories aimed at providing operational definitions and a direction towards the understanding of 
the study of consciousness. Most tests and theories studied were identified as capable of providing ample evidence for the proof of 
consciousness in certain living and non-living organisms. Some flaws in these tests however, made laudable efforts in the study of 
consciousness amount to near nothing, thereby condemning thinkers to endless debates. The study recommends that thinkers of the 21'' 
century resolve to adopting synthetic and pluralistic approaches in the formulation of theories as the road to future progress in the study of 
consciousness. 
Key Words: Consciousness, Empirical, Mental States, Pluralistic, Synthetic, Theories. 
L INTRODUCTION 
Some theorists (Chalmers, 1997; Negel, 1974) uphold that sense perception is a conscious way in which individuals relate to the world while 
thought tends to occur unconsciously. The mind with all its functioning (in its thinking process) seems to be a different kin~;Kof mental activity 
from consciousness. It is as if there is a subjective state occurring when one deliberates, it is as if there is something it is like to deliberate or 
produce a thought which one can be aware of. But when someone steps on another's hand for instancTtfhey feel pain. This is because there is 
something that it is like to be in pain since such experience has been had by, at least someone etse before. On the other hand, there IS 
something it is like to eat a plat of chocolate cake. Furthermore, onecan tell the difference betWeen b'eing in pain and eating a plate of 
chocolate cake; the second is pleasurable while the first is not. 
The whole idea seems pleasurable when it's applied to oneself and the experien:ifjif.Of their; thoughts, deliberations and perceptions. 
However, the whole scenario becomes problematic when we try to claim consciousness··for someonepther than our selves. One m1ght know 
what pain feels like when they are stepped on by mistake. They may also know what a god sensaJ:19n is like when they eat a plate of chocolate 
cake. The question however is; what bearing do these personal experiences have ori an indjvIidu~q? Perhaps one can never tell. An individual 
may have the sensation of eating chocolate cake when he is stepped on or t1ey ~""erhaps; feel pain and wince when they eat a plate of 
cake. The real question here is "can anyone from the first person perspective, kn=·about someone else's consciousness? Science can explain 
how the brain works but it cannot account for or explain, how individuals feels accvrately at one point in time. If and when we treat other 
people as if we are certain about their consciousness or conscious state,'we will be making misguided assumptions. 
A renowned researcher who had written extensively in the area of cofi%£:iousness is expected to know a lot about consciousness and how it 
relates with other people. But the truth is, all the knowledge about con$ciisness may never really arm us with the knowledge about what is 
going on inside the head of the researcher nor can he claim to' know what is inside the mind of the other persons. This dilemma in philosophy is 
generally known as the problem of other minds ECh~grsI 19~lTFKqhat one has the knowledge of what is going on in his mind is no premise 
from where such persons can claim to know or have any proper way of having access to the activities in the mind of others. The truth therefore 
is; we may never know for sure whether the people ih questiorj;.have minds or not. 
Some studies (Chalmers, 1997) have advancedthree steps towards the direction of ascertaining the conscious states of individuals. The first Yi' .•. ,.n 
person-subjective experience for Chalmers ~asl<kbeenK conceived as the starting point for determining who has consciousness. (I can observe my 
own consciousness) as captured in t~~K}houghtsDnf"ene Descartes, Corgito ergo sum"! think therefore I am". Here an individual can observe 
their own awareness. The second ReTson, ope different from myself, is able verify that you are conscious by the applications and adoption of 
the same processes which aided otiler person~ own confirmation. The hard and third step is the point where individuals can only assume that 
theyare conscious. This is beca~gIAe th)y,lamqot know for certain that the other person is. When we make assumptions that other people are 
conscious, we do so based on indi~~?D;lvfdence: the fact that human beings have many things in common, our brains and evolutionary 
processes for instanc~IK ou~kA pat~rn etc, are all remarkably the same. With so much in common, why not have a consciousness that is 
common to all as wt!fl?''? w·· • 
This stGdy therefore is :a critical analysis of studies and attempts to capture the meaning and essence of consciousness among individuals, 
animals. ~nd inanim~te obj~ with the view to ascertaining how this reality influence the wellbeing and development of the individual in his 
environn1~ntK illt.,study'atso considered critically, certain step (tests) and theories which have been taken and proposed in the past to test or 
/''( t~ 
ascertain the <;~IbIgree of consciousness in animate and inanimate beings. 
~I; ;; ~ ' 
2. BAC~~9fgka TO THE STUDY AND THE NATURE CONSCIOUSNESS 
Explaining the true nature of consciousness for thinkers toady is one of the most important and perplexing areas of philosophy. Consciousness 
is a subject of much research in philosophy of mind, psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, cognitive neuroscience and artificial 
intelligence. There are broadly two competing school of thought in the philosophy of mind which have done extensive study towards 
understanding the nature of consciousness. These two schools of thought are captured in the dualist and the materialist theories propounded 
by them. Studies (Butler, 1863; Shieber, 2004) conducted by both schools of thought tend to raise more questions than answers. Questions in 
this class include: Is there a relationship between consciousness and science? What are the neutral correlates of consciousness? To what extent 
is the human mind different from that of the animal? Can any machine, given the right programming, become conscious? (Marcus, 2002). 
\:Vo;?,u <1L 
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The history of Western philosophy contains a rich collection of literature which goes back to the time of ancient philosophers on subjects 
such as the human nature, the soul and the mind. Sophisticated works on the nature of consciousness have been found in the works of 
Aristotle, (Caston, 2002:715-815). The works of Rene Descartes in the early modern era however, placed the subject of consciousness and the 
relationship it has with the mind and the body on the centre stage. For Descartes, he argued that the mind was a nonphysical substance 
different from the body. He also did not believe that conscious mental states also exists (Descartes, 2008). G. W. Leibniz was also known to 
have believed in the immaterial nature of mental substances which he called "monads'. He more importantly tried to distinguish between 
perception and apperception, that is (outer-directed consciousness and self-consciousness) Gennaro (1999). 
The most important and detailed theory of mind is associated with the works of Immanuel Kant. His main work: A Critique to Pure Reason 
captures to a large extent, his studies on the nature of consciousness and the mind body relationship. Kant had thought that an adequate 
account of phenomenal consciousness involved far more than what his predecessors were willing to accept regarding the,,nature of 
consciousness. He believed that there were mental states which were presupposed in the conscious experience. Consequently, Kant presented 
an elaborate theory to capture what these structures are. These positions correlated with the claims of Leibniz who saw the need to postulate 
the existence of unconscious mental states and mechanisms in order to provide an adequate theory of mind(Kicher, 1990; Brook, 1994). 
Apart from the attacks and banishment which the study of consciousness suffered in the hands of behaviouralists psychologist (Skinner, 
1953), others from psychology were known to be deeply interested with the study of consciousness and the various methods proposed for 
investigating it and how it affects the mind. Other notable thinkers whose works had advanced studies on this subject include: Edmund Husserl, 
Martin Heidegger and the works of Sigmund Freud. The works of Freud brought about the near unive~qIal acceptance of the existence of 
unconscious mental start and processes. 
Let us note that the few names mentions above did not have much scientific knowledgeI~bou~ th~ workings of the brain in detail. The 
advancement we now have today is attributed to the recent studies in neuropsychology. We have r,easonto believe that present researchers in 
this area are partly responsible for the unprecedented interdisciplinary advances made irf th~D~eas of consciousness since the 1980's. 
Consequently, several journals have been devoted to its study for example: Consciousne'li$ and Cog~itionI Journal of Consciousness Studies, and 
Psyche. There is also an entire book series dedicated to the study of consciousn~ Aiiqq[lces in 'consciousness Research, published by John 
Benjamins. Others who have notable works in small introductory text include:!:fki~:· ~9S; Genharo, 1996b; Block et al., 1997; Seager, 1999; 
Chalmers, 2002), to mention but a few. 0 ,,,, "q: 1 
3. CONCEPTUAl ANALYSIS OF THE SUBJECT OF COf<:)C!OU9NESS 
[ 
Consciousness have been defined in various ways; first as a subjective experience, as an awareness, the ability to experience "feelings", 
wakefulness, the understanding of the concept "self", or the eI~!fcrt~~trol system of the mind (Fathering, 1992). It is also an umbrella term 
that may also refer to a verity of mental phenomena. (VarhGulick, 2004). Although human beings realize what every day experiences are, 
consciousness refuses to be defined. Consequently, Searle (2005) made the fJ(Iowing deductions: 
• • # 
1. Consciousness is a state or condition of being,fonleious. 
2. Consciousness is a sense of one's persorfil o~cAff~btive identity, including the attitudes, beliefs, and sensitivities held by or considered 
characteristic of an individual grou,ll_ ·. '\ ''" 
3. A special kind of awareness or senslttvttyiififa~s consciousness, race consciousness 
4. The kind of alertness or concern f&;>r a pai'ikular issue or situation: a movement aimd at raising the general public's consciousness of 
social injustice. D~~ 
These standard definitions sf~ II guide our stbdy in this text. 
t,:g f 
3.1. The Oxford Companioh to the Body (Oxford Companion, 2000) captures the twentieth-century British Psychologist; Stuart Sutherland who 
once defined consciousne~ .. as;"" 
~IIKK{;K 
... a fascinating but elusiveKmi{~nomenon: it is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it evolved. Nothing worth reading has been 
writteylj~boulEi .. corlsCiousn~~s is indeed hard to define, but most people have an intuitive idea about what it is. It encompasses two different 
concepts; ~he notion of a self and the feeling of which the self is aware, especially qua/ia- our raw sensory experience. 
,, ~· 41! 
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3.2. BritannicacC?,ncise Encyclopaedia (Britannica 2004) captures consciousness as: 
The quality or S\ate of being aware, as applied to the lower animals, consciousness refers to the capacity for sensation and usually volition. In 
higher animals this capacity may also include thinking and motion. In human beings consciousness is understood to include "meta-awareness", 
an awareness that one is aware. The term also broadly refers to the upper level of mental life of which the person is aware, as contrasted with 
unconscious processes. Levels of consciousness (e.g., attention vs sleep) are correlated with patterns of electrical activities in the brain (brain 
waves). 
3.3. The Home Library Health Psychoanalysis Dictionary (HLP Dictionary, 2004).Records shows that this dictionary, in an attempt to define 
consciousness, made great defence to most of Freud's ideas (Freud, 1900a) where he made the following remarks: 
In psychology, consciousness is the subjects of immediate apprehension of mental activity. Although Freud thought that conscious processes 
are "the same as the consciousness of the philosopher and of every day opinion" and "a fact without parallel, which defiles all explanation or 
lfJ:)dU <<.L 
description" He argued that they could not be considered the "essence" of mental life. Rather consciousness has a fugitive quality and does not 
"form unbroken sequences which are complete in themselves" {p. 157). "The physical, whatever its nature may be, is in itself unconscious and 
probably similar in kind to all other natural processes of which we have obtained knowledge" {p. 283) Freud however still stressed that 
consciousness still plays an important role, indeed it is "the one light which illuminates our path and leads us through the darkness of mental 
life" {p. 286). 
The work of the psychoanalysis, as Freud saw it is "translating unconscious processes into conscious ones and thus filling in the gaps in 
conscious perception" {HLP Dictionary, 2004:286). Consciousness from this perspective is the qualitative perception of information arising both 
from the external world and from the internal world: an external world that is unknowable to itself and to which we have access only via 
subjective elements collected by our sense organs and an internal world that consists of unconscious mental processes and what we are aware 
of solely through sensations of pressure I displeasure and revived memories. In Freud's own wards, "A person' own body, and above its entire 
surface, is a place from which both external and internal perceptions may spring. {HLP Dictionary, 2004:25). 
4. PHilOSOPHIC AND SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES TO CONSCIOUSNESS 
The hard problem of consciousness formulated by Chalmers in 1996 deals with the issue of how to explain a state of phenomenal 
consciousness in terms of the neurological basis {Dennett, 2004:375). Access Consciousness {A- consciousness) is the phenomenon whereby 
information in our mind is accessible for verbal report, reasoning and the control of behaviour. So wben'lwe perceive, information about what 
we perceive is often access conscious, when we remember information about the past, susr as somethingie<!£rt in the past, it is often access 
conscious. In Chalmers' opinion, access consciousness is less mysterious than phenomenal c"onsc!ousneps. Thisils why it is believed to pose one 
of the easy problems of consciousness. 
Phenomenal Consciousness on the other hand is simply the consciousness associatediwftt\ experience {Block, 2004). It is moving, coloured 
forms, sound, sensations, emotions and feelings with our bodies and responses at the c.entre. qhe~e experiences considered independently of 
any impact on behaviour are called Qualia. The hard problem of consciousness as fqn;nulated by o~Dsid Chalmers in 1966 deals with the issue of 
%'¢ hl:f,; ~ 
"how to explain a state of phenomenal consciousness in terms of its neurologica!;basis (pennr!tt, 2004:375). 
Philosophical responses to the subject of consciousness from thinkers such asGMalebranche, Thomas Reid, John Locke, David Hume and 
. ~ 
Immanuel Kant all vary. Descartes and Malebranche for instance agreed that humI~K{ypeings where composed mainly of two elements: Body 
and Mind and that conscious experience resided in the latter. David . .j-tume and T;;;;;anuel Kant also differed from Descartes in that they 
avoided mentioning a place from which experience is viewed. Other philg,sophers such as George Berkeley have proposed that the content of 
consciences are an aspect of mind and do not necessarily involve m<~y~Kat all. This is a type of idealism. Yet other such as Leibniz, have 
considered that each point in the universe is endowed with conscious contlt This is a form of Pan psych ism. Panpsychism is the belief that all 
matter, including rocks for example, is sentient or conscLQ\!5· ·.; 
Cognitive Psychology and Cognitive keuroscienc~Dff~~er the scientific approach portray how consciousness as a research topic was strongly 
discouraged by main stream scholars because of thei-conaftns of valldations of both primary and secondary data. Today modern investigations 
into the subject of consciousness are based on m~uchological statistical studies and case studies of consciousness states. Early discoveries made 
in this area revealed that the mind is a comple>t';structtlre derived from various localized functions that are bound together with a unitary 
awareness. ! .. , 
Consciousness and Experimen,af ~!lnsfphy: A new approach has attempted to combine the methodology of cognitive psychology and 
traditional philosophy to understatj!, consciou~nessK These researches have taken place in the field of experimental philosophy which seeks to 
use empirical methods {like coDliu~g expT~fments to test how ordinary non-experts think) to inform philosophical discursions {Knobe, 2004). 
The main aim behind this kind of phiiJ$0phkal research on consciousness has been to try to get a better grasp on how people ordinarily 
understand consciousness! for insta,nce, work by Joshua Knabe and Jesse Prinz suggest that people may have two different ways of 
understanding minjsDgene~lly {JoshLa Knobe and Jesse Prinz, 2008). Other group of thinkers have argued that there is actually no such 
phenomet:~on as consciousness {Sytsma, 2009). 
"it ; t::t ;·,, 
5. qbp~~;~oDC!?kpCi NESS 
The f<J.'it'that there has not been a clear cut definition of consciousness and the fact that there is no empirical measure that exists to test its 
presence, most"th,inkers have argued, is as a result of the problem of consciousness. This general problem of consciousness they believe, has 
made empiricD!~ Jest intrinsically impossible. This notwithstanding, several test have been developed which attempts to provide operational 
definitio~s tt9lcbnsciousness. Some of these tests have been extended in the area of determining whether machines and non-human animals 
can demonstrate through certain behaviours- by passing certain tests- be elevated to the class of the conscious. We shall in this section of the 
study consider a few of the tests which top the chart in the study of consciousness. 
The Turing Test 
The Turing test, most often than not, has been conceived as a test for consciousness, or some kind of behavioural tests for the presence of 
mind, thought or intelligence in simple minded entities. The test {Turing Test) is named after a computer scientist Alan Turing who was the first 
to design the test. It is actually a test designed to proof whether computers could satisfy the requirement which will allows individuals ascribe 
to them the quality of "intelligence". Consequently, the tests has often been cited in discussions of artificial intelligence. The test is simply 
based on "the limitation Game". A human conducting the experiment tries, via the aid of a computer keyboard, tocommunicates with two 
others, one a computer and the other, an individual who is presumed conscious. The mode of communications among the trio will be without 
voice such that none of the participants will know the person communicating at a point in time. If at the end of the conversation, the human is 
unable to identify who in particular made which comment or contribution, the computer is at this stage presumed to have passed the test 
(Turing test) thereby certifying the operational definition for intelligence and consciences. 
It is important to note that this test has generated a great deal of philosophical debate. Daniel Dennett and Douglas Hofstadter have 
argued that anything capable of passing the test should qualify as conscious (Dennett & Hofstadter, 1985). On the other hand, David Chalmers 
and other have argued that since philosophical zombies could pass the same test, it still does not qualify them to the class of the "intelligent" or 
the "conscious". Others have considered the very questions "whether machines can think or partake in the quality called intelligence" a 
fallacious one which shouldn't have come up in the first place. To them, the same questions about the computers intelligence or consciousness 
is equivalent to asking "can submarines swim? 
The Chinese Room Test 
John Searle, a Philosopher was known to have developed the thought experiment, The Chinese room argument which was solely designed to 
show the flaws within the Turing test (Searle,1980). In this experiment, Searle asked the reader to imagine a non-Chinese speaker in a room 
filled with Chinese symbols and a rule book to guide the none Chinese speaking person with the response hf;]will need to make to the questions 
which will be passed on to him via a slot. The person is expected to respond by looking at the slot and-with,the aid of those Chinese symbols, he 
is expected to respond to the questions with correct replies from the rule book on the Chine_~e lartMi~ already at his disposal. Now based 
purely on the input and output operations, the person in the Chinese room gives a clear understanding of the Chinese language. The truth 
however is that the person in the Chinese room understands no Chinese at all. He is"'Cfnly a~ to respond correctly because of the 
corresponding symbols which he has at his disposal. This argument has been the subject of many philosophical debates since the argument was 
first proposed in 1980, consequently, volumes have been written on the topic a ionK~~-K 
For want of space, we may not be able to discuss the Delay Test and the Mirror' Test which are avenues designed to test the existence of 
conscious mental states in man and other non-human elements. 
6. THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS 1 
Irrespective of the potency inherent in the test discussed above, it is c1Jar from the forgoing analysis that while some of the tests considered 
above in this study give ample reasons to infer consciousness iiDv1t:~I~st subjects under review, the same test when view from another 
perspective, gives convincing reasons to reconsider the initi'ally held-~lrsitign on the subject under review. The argument made to affirm 
consciousness or intelligence in the Turing test was flowed i~ the Chinese ~m test. These tests therefore failed to offer the much desired 
platform for understand the intrinsic workings of sen~e per~tio~1 41··· 
The problem of consciousness in the field of psy~~IojEiv and philosophy becomes an equally divers project for the 21sst century researcher 
who must find ways of explaining the phenom~~a wtliC:h abounds in his every day endeavour. Not only do many aspects of mind count as 
conscious in some sense, each is also opened to''yarious· respects in which it might be explained or modelled. Understanding consciousness 
involves a multiplicity, not only of explan'ada, b~~<!gpo of questions that the pose and the sort of answers which they require. At the risk of 
oversimplifying, the relevant questionS'tal'!,,be gatHered under three crude rubrics as What, How, and the Why. 
The main focus of the three questions i~ a)rected respectively at describing the features of consciousness, explaining its underlying basis or 
cause and explaining its role or value:Thinkers. believe that the division among the tree are artificial therefore in practice, the answer one gives 
t9v~D , , ; 
to each will depend it pa~;rDith whaf one says about the other questions. One cannot for example adequately describe the "what" question 
and describe the main features of cdp;;ciousness without the "why" issues of its functional role in the system whose operations it affects. Nor 
could one explain how the rele~~Dl~ s'b.rt of consciousness might rise from non-conscious processes unless one has a clear account of just what 
features had to be realized. to count as producing it. Those caveats notwithstanding, the three different questions provide us with the platform 
for artihDlaiinC;Ighe-explanato~ process of particular theories or models of consciousness. 
'%.( ····· 
7. qebE}~~ led~kpCflrpkbpp 
While thinkers press towards offering explanations to the "What, How and Why" questions of consciousness, theories of consciousness have 
been formulate1fand directed at capturing the intricate nature of the subject matter consciousness. However studies reveal that not all 
theories"of'consciousness say the something. They vary not only in specific sort, but also in their theoretical aims. The largest division of most 
theories reviewed for this study tends to fall between two main categories: the metaphysical theories, which aims at locating consciousness in 
the overall ontological scheme of reality and more specific theories which aims at offering in some detail, the nature, role and feature of 
consciousness. 
('>." 
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combines the representationalist model with a higher-order theory but does so in a way that varies interestingly with the more standard 
versions of either. The MOM includes many distinctive but interrelated features. The name of this theory reflects the facts that at any given 
moment, content fixation of many sorts are occurring throughout the brain. What makes most of these content conscious is not that they occur 
in a privileged spatial mode or formant, all of which the MOM denies. It is rather what Dennett calls" cerebral celebrity'' i.e. the degree to 
which a given content influence the development of other contents throughout the brain, especially with regards to how those effects are 
manifest in the reports and behaviours that the person makes in response to various probes that might indicate there conscious state. 
Dennetts MOM has been highly influential but has also drawn criticism especially from those who find it insufficiently realist in its view of 
consciousness and at best insufficient in achieving its stated goal to fully explain it (Dretske, 1994:41-58) Many of its critics acknowledge the 
insight and value of the MOM but deny that there are no real facts of consciousness other than those captured by it (Rosenthal, 1994:319-350; 
Van Gulick, 1994:443-456; Akins, 1996:1-43). 
8. CONCUJS!ON & RECOMMENDT!ONS 
In concluding this section, it appears that a comprehensive understanding of consciousness will likely require theories of many types. One 
might usefully and without contradiction, accept a diversity of models that each in their own wayaims at respectively explaining the physical, 
neutral, cognitive, functional, representational, and high-other aspects of consciousness. There is unlikely to be any single theoretical 
perspective that suffices for explaining all the features of consciousness that we wish to understand. Thus a synthetics and pluralistic approach 
may provide the best road to future progress in the study of consciousness. 
Psychologists, thinkers and researchers in the area of rural development need to understand tha.t a"Yareness and sense perceptions in the 
rural and urban areas different owing to various factors prevailing in the areas under focus.Tiae wellbi!lng of the rural and urban dwellers in 
this 21'' century can be achieved if researchers adopt the synthetic and pluralistic approach to the study of persons and groups in the area 
under focus. f 
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